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1. Overcoming the political and institutional tensions that have characterized Italy in the last fourteen 
months opens up new prospects for economic growth and cooperative relations with the European 
institutions. In this regard, the recent appointment of former Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni 
as the European Commissioner of Economy is an important signal. However, these promising 
prospects will not automatically translate into actual progress. For example, the scope of the Economy 
portfolio assigned to Gentiloni as designated commissioner is different from the one of Economic 
Affairs, held in the old (and still operative) Commission by Pierre Moscovici; above all, Gentiloni’s 
scope is more limited than that attributed to Valdis Dombrovskis as designated executive Vice-
President with responsibility for one of the three crucial areas of the new Commission (that is, 
Economy). In this perspective, the fact that Dombrovskis has a coordinating function also – but not 
only – in relation to Gentiloni’s range of activity shows how important it is that Italy does not force 
the European constraints and – at the same time – takes advantage of the many opportunities 
provided by the guidelines of the new Commission. These guidelines were clearly specified in the 
program presented by the new President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for her election 
by the European Parliament.  
Similar and complementary considerations apply to the action of the new Italian government. To 
increase Italy’s economic growth, the new coalition between the Five Star Movement (FSM) and the 
Democratic Party must: (i) overcome their latent internal conflict, thus avoiding the reappearance in 
new forms of the pre-existing climate of political uncertainty; (ii) launch an effective economic policy 
package that will encourage sustainable development in the short and medium-long term, one that 
is, at the same time, compatible with Italy’s commitments to the European institutions and with Italy 
regaining its central role in the European Union (EU).  
In this Policy Brief I will focus on point (ii), keeping the short-term problems separate from the 
medium to long-term ones, even if, in the actual way the Italian economy works, the two problems 
are strongly intertwined. 
 
2. We begin with the short term, referring to the upcoming deadlines for defining, approving, and 
adopting the 2020 Italian Budget law. 
The budget adjustments implemented in July 2019 by the FSM-League government in order to stop 
the European procedure for excessive disequilibria in the Italian balance sheet in terms of public debt 
(see the related Budget re-balancing law) restored the conditions necessary so that the public 
deficit/GDP ratio at the end of 2019 would be around the threshold of 1.9% (according to the 
government’s assessment), or 2% (according to the assessment of the Commission). In any case, these 
thresholds were close to those indicated in the 2019 Italian Budget Law (approved in December 2018). 
The result appeared achievable even with an Italian GDP’s growth rate significantly lower than 0.5%.  
It is very likely that, at the end of the current year, this forecast may prove to be too conservative 
thanks to two factors that could not be fully included in the Budget re-balancing law: the use of the 
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two leading initiatives launched by the previous government (“Citizen's Income” and “Quota 100 
retirement scheme”) is being translated into expenditure that is below the relative funds allocated in 
the Budget Law for 2019; the revenues coming from one-off events, mainly those from indirect taxes 
(VAT) due to the introduction of electronic invoicing, are increasing significantly. By mid-July 2019, 
the Italian Parliamentary Budget Office estimated, balancing these dynamics and the downward 
trend in the growth rate, that the Italian public deficit/GDP ratio could decrease to 1.8% of GDP for 
2019.1 
Over the summer, expectations of lower government spending and higher government revenue 
increased in Italy. The most recent estimates indicate a decrease in expenditure of around EUR 5 
billion and an increase in revenue of around EUR 2.5-3 billion. Moreover, these same macroeconomic 
adjustments, combined with the results of the European elections at the end of June 2019 and with 
the foreseen revival of non-conventional and expansionary European Central Bank monetary 
policies, already triggered reductions in the structure of the interest rates on the Italian sovereign 
bond during last July; this trend accelerated with the formation of the new government. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that, if the European Central Bank restores the unconventional monetary 
policies in the terms expected by market participants,  the financial burden on the service of Italian 
public debt at the end of 2019 will decrease by about 500 million euros compared to what was 
provided for by the previous Budget Law. 
Unless there are major and positive breakthroughs in the Trump administration’s approach to 
international trade and in the British government’s approach to Brexit, the last months of 2019 will 
record a slowdown for the United States and the euro-area economies. As a consequence, also the 
growth rate of Italy’s GDP for all of 2019 will be much lower than the forecasts of the previous 
government (0.1% at the most). Even in this negative scenario, previous considerations suggest that, 
in Italy, the public deficit/GDP ratio for 2019 could be around 1.6%.  
In the Updates to the Economic and Financial Document (NADEF), which the new Italian 
government will have to submit to the European Commission by the end of September 2019, this ratio 
of 1.6% should comply with the commitments that Italy made towards the EU institutions for 2019. 
Moreover, if it was possible to assume an arrangement in which the legislation is unchanged, the 
consequent “carry-over effects” should ensure the implementation of the 0.6% reduction in the 
structural deficit/GDP ratio for 2020. Note that this reduction was the one requested by the European 
Commission since it would allow Italy to gradually approach its Medium-Term Objective (MTO); and 
that this same reduction is an important component of the new commitments made by the past Italian 
government to the EU in last July. Let me add that it is plausible to anticipate a further fall in interest 
rates on Italian sovereign bonds of various maturity and a positive – although moderate – GDP 
growth rate for the new year (0.4% in the forecast of the Parliamentary Budget Office). If the 
 
1 See: Hearing of the President of the Parliamentary Budget Office on recent government interventions in the field of public 
finance balances, 16 July 2019. 
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legislation is unchanged, all these elements will allow Italy to have a public deficit/GDP ratio for 2020 
of about 1.2%.  
 
3. This framework of fiscal rebalancing is, however, unrealistic. First, even if it were implemented in 
the terms set out above, it would be partial because it would ' forget’ the problem of Italy’s public debt. 
Furthermore, this same framework cannot be implemented because it should be based on passive 
and restrictive fiscal policies (full increase in VAT rates without stimulus for getting out of the current 
economic stagnation). Due to the current economic stagnation, these policies would have a short-
term recessive impact on the Italian economy and, therefore, would not be compatible with the 
internal equilibria of the new government.  
Hence, it is a question of redefining the outlined framework by introducing at least three additional 
factors: 
 
(a)  The decrease in the public deficit/GDP ratio in 2019 will not result in a corresponding fall in the 
Italian public debt/GDP ratio since there will be a shortfall of 18 billion euro foreseen in the Budget 
Law for 2019, which would have to be the result of the sale of publicly owned shares in a number of 
companies (17 billion) and in real estate (1 billion). Having twice experienced the launch of a procedure 
for excessive public debt (November 2018 and June 2019), Italy will be forced to create a credible 
strategy of gradual reduction of the public debt/GDP ratio in its Budget Law for 2020 without having 
recourse to distortionary tricks (such as the transfers of controlling shares of state companies  from 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance to the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, which is itself under this 
Ministry’s control).  
 
(b)   Ever since the  NADEF and, more importantly, in the Draft Budget Law for 2020 (to be submitted 
to the European Commission by mid-October 2019), the new Italian government will be required to 
specify the alternative funds to be used to deactivate the safeguard clauses, which, for 2020, would 
imply increases in VAT and in some excise duties for more than € 23 billion; one of the qualifying 
points of the economic program both of the old and the new government excludes, in fact (in our 
opinion, too stringently), the implementation, even partial, of these clauses. 
 
(c)   Although still generic, the other qualifying points of the new government’s economic program 
outline interventions for the support of Italian economic growth (reduction of the ‘tax wedge’, re-
launching of public investment, more robust incentives for innovation and education), as well as 
social cohesion (minimum wage, reduction of poverty); a prudential estimate signals that these 
interventions would lead to decreases in revenue and increases in public expenditure for an amount 
of at least 15 billion euro in 2020; it is important to note that a large part of the funds set aside for 
public investment was in fact used differently in the past financial years and should, therefore, be 
restored.  
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In the face of a downward trend in the public deficit/GDP ratio with the legislation unchanged (1.2% 
for 2020: see above), Italy is therefore in danger of facing an increased public imbalance of more than 
two percentage points of GDP. In 2020, as in the following years, an increase in the public deficit/GDP 
ratio beyond (or even around) the 3% threshold would, however, be incompatible with the 
agreements made with the EU institutions. Above all, this increase would have effects that are even 
more important for the public debt/GDP ratio: given the lack of reduction of this ratio in 2019, in the 
absence of ad hoc adjustments, the growing dynamic of the Italian public debt on GDP would be 
confirmed and aggravated in the following years. This dynamic would expose Italy to new pressures 
for excessive public debt (with the high risk of thwarting the reduction of the financial charges on the 
public debt). This would call into question the medium-term sustainability of the Italian balance 
sheet. 
 
4. The realistic short-term picture is, therefore, much more problematic than that suggested by the 
previous unrealistic assumption of an unchanged legislation. It is therefore necessary that, without 
falling into the habit of indiscriminately canceling what was done by the previous government, the 
new Italian coalition reduce the imbalances in the public budget for 2020 and the subsequent years 
by adjusting, as far as possible, the more inefficient items of government expenditures or of tax cuts 
implemented in 2019 (“Quota 100 Retirement Scheme”; a ‘flat tax’ for a part of self-employed workers 
with a yearly income below a given threshold; and so on).  
The problems to be addressed, however, will become even more difficult to handle if we link the short-
term framework, outlined above by focusing on the presentation of the Budget Law for 2020 and its 
preparatory stages, to the medium-to long-term prospects. 
Recent analyses confirm that the Italian economy and, in particular, the manufacturing sector can 
count on outstanding firms that are competitive on the international frontiers of innovation and that 
defend and strengthen Italy’s share in world trade. These firms, however, do not have a significant 
number of national imitators. Most Italian firms, therefore, remain uncompetitive also because of their 
very small size, poorly adapting to the combination of technical and organizational innovations 
imposed by the new technological trajectories. This explains why Italy’s economy is an extreme case 
of those innovation lags experienced in the euro area and in the EU as a whole with respect to China 
and the United States in the artificial intelligence and digital fields. This twofold Italian delay 
(compared to the non-European international areas and the EU itself) is the main cause of the 
stagnant trend in Italy’s average labor productivity and other forms of productivity, which has 
characterized the last twenty years and more, and which has created a growing gap between the 
limited subset of efficient and internationalized Italian firms and the backward body of the other 
national firms. Adding to the negative demographic dynamics (increasing population ageing), the 
stagnant average labor productivity implies that Italy’s lack of economic growth is a structural factor 
and not a cyclical one.  
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It is therefore essential for the new Italian government to launch, as soon as possible, a systematic 
and well-designed set of incentives for innovation. In this regard, the recommendation to the new 
government would be to efficiently allocate the limited available resources by establishing, for 
example, close links between the composition of the new public investments and the stimuli for the 
dimensional growth of very small and small private firms with innovation potential. 
The opening of the Italian economy to innovation, which is an essential condition for the restart of 
medium to long-term growth can however accentuate, in the short and medium term, Italy’s serious 
social vulnerabilities. Already today the Italian participation rate, that is, the active presence in the 
labor market of the (declining) share of the Italian population in working age, is one of the lowest 
among economically advanced countries. Despite this, Italy’s unemployment rate, that is, the 
percentage of those who are actively searching for a job in the labor market but cannot find 
employment, is structurally above the European average (especially for vulnerable groups of workers 
and, in particular, for young people; and in the most marginal areas such as southern Italy). Moreover, 
Italian employees have skills that are poorly adapted to innovative productions because they have 
lower levels of education and qualification than the average of their European peers and, with the 
same education, have specializations that do not correspond with advanced technical skills. The 
result is that Italian firms try to compensate for the low quality of their labor demand and supply by 
reducing monetary wages, which – moreover - are burdened by a high ‘tax wedge’, or by resorting to 
short-term solutions that accentuate the structural inefficiencies of Italy’s economy (temporary jobs 
without protection). It is not surprising that, in this situation, Italy was unable to handle the increased 
inequalities in income distribution that occurred in the early nineties, that is, in the years in which the 
core countries of the EU and the euro area began to adopt new and innovative technologies. 
Consequently, in the last two decades Italy has witnessed the growth of the phenomenon of ‘poor’ 
employees and the incidence of absolute and relative poverty as the result of a further polarization 
between the highest and the lowest income classes.    
In the presence of such vulnerability, a pervasive introduction of innovative processes in the Italian 
economy without the corrective interventions of a social policy would have the effect of making the 
utilization of a significant part of the current employees even more inefficient or useless, thus 
aggravating the marginalization and the fall into some form of poverty of a still wider part of the 
population in the working age. It is therefore essential that the new Italian government increase 
investment in education and training, reduce the ‘tax wedge’, strengthen the fight against poverty, 
provide new safety nets for low income workers and the unemployed. If anything, the 
recommendation to be made is that the new Italian government should not limit itself to sporadic 
interventions but finance a systematic plan for the reform of the welfare state. The traditional idea 
that the welfare state should only intervene ex post in order to protect and re-integrate the population 
groups most affected by economic changes must be overcome. Instead, the government should 
intervene, above all ex ante, in order to prepare and/or adapt the population in advance, especially 
but not only the young people, to the changes taking place in innovative processes.  
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5. These considerations have at least two implications. Firstly, they show that, in the long term, the 
management of the Italian public balance sheet cannot be simple maintenance or routine. If the 
objective is to make Italy a competitive country characterized by sustainable growth within one of the 
most advanced areas of the international economy (the EU), it is necessary to provide for a radical 
change in the composition of public expenditure and revenue and be ready to manage the impacts 
of these changes on consolidated interests. Only in this way will it be possible to build a society open 
to economic innovation and focused on social fairness (equality of opportunities in a substantial 
sense). Secondly, the same considerations show that, in the short term, the problems of the Italian 
balance sheet cannot be tackled effectively if the already difficult combination of growth stimuli and 
imbalances adjustments are separated from the long-term objectives and the related medium-to 
long-term interventions. Any increase in public expenditure and/or reduction of taxation must be 
elements of a broad structural plan that is complemented by ‘cuts’ in public expenditures that are 
becoming socially ineffective and economically inefficient with respect to the most innovative and 
fairest society that Italy intends to build in the medium to long term.  
These two implications may appear visionary. However, they have at least three very concrete 
consequences both at national and European levels. 
At the national level, it follows that Italy’s economic and social decline can be stopped only if it is 
admitted that, during the extraordinary period of rapid economic development after WWII (1952-
1979) and – above all – in the following decade, Italy accumulated and crystallized a large number of 
rent-seeking positions that today are no longer sustainable in terms of public debt and social 
cohesion. The non-ordinary management of the public balance sheet must reduce these rent-seeking 
positions through the implementation of specific interventions able to overcome the many public and 
private inefficiencies. 
The two consequences at the European level, on the other hand, are based on an easy but distorted 
possibility of linking short-term and long-term problems: the search for more fiscal ‘flexibility’ rather 
than binding contractual arrangements with respect to European rules.  
The preceding analysis makes it clear that for the new Italian government it would be almost 
impossible to reconcile the revival of sustainable medium-to-long-term growth with gradual 
adjustments of Italy’s public debt without European cooperation. The latter would have to make Italy 
able to manage, in the short term, the financial costs arising from efficient public investment 
programs for the reform, for example, of Italy’s education systems or for the renewal, for example, of 
intangible infrastructure to facilitate the innovation of Italian firms. This cooperation may, however, 
lead to two alternative strategies. Firstly, the European institutions grant Italy the so-called fiscal 
flexibility, i.e. loosen the constraints with respect to Italy’s convergence towards its medium-term 
objective (MTO) and hence allow temporary increases of its public deficit/GDP, which are 
incompatible with the related structural adjustments. It is worth noting that this flexibility is offered 
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without an assessment and the centralized control of the Italian allocation of excess expenditure or 
reduced revenues, but also without the assumption of any commitment on the part of the European 
institutions to support the Italian government in managing its balance sheet in case of future 
difficulties. The second possibility is that Italy agrees with the European institutions on a multi-annual 
program of reforms and investments, and accepts periodic and centralized European controls on the 
gradual implementation of such a program. In exchange, Italy gets centralized funding that does not 
entirely account for its balance sheet, as long as the program is implemented according to the original 
agreements and is consistent with its explicit medium-to long-term objectives.  
The first strategy, which is preferred by any national government because it does not place restrictions 
on its fiscal choices, is very dangerous. As has happened in Italy in the recent past, it tends to translate 
into a use of flexibility for short-term purposes that disregard the medium-to long-term program. The 
result is that, once the margins of flexibility granted by the European institutions are exhausted, the 
country (in this case Italy) would find itself with aggravated imbalances in its public balance sheet 
and, therefore, with even more binding constraints for the revival of long-term sustainable growth. 
The second strategy, which in the short term appears to be more politically costly because it results 
in a transfer (even if agreed, partial and temporary) of national sovereignty in fiscal policy to the EU, 
is conversely an opportunity to translate the management of the public balance sheet into a sequence 
of steps consistent with a long-term program at least partially supported by the European institutions. 
The objection that can be made with respect to the conclusion suggested here, and which leads us to 
the second consequence at the European level, is that the first strategy ends up weakening the EU 
and the euro area’s existing and distorting fiscal rules while the second strategy fully accepts and 
legitimizes these rules. According to this view, fiscal flexibility would have a positive impact not so 
much because of its short-term effects on national public balance sheets but because it would act as 
a lever to loosen the rules and strengthen cooperation between EU and euro-area countries in the 
long term.  
This objection, however, is likely to have unintentional but negative and serious effects. It is true that 
European fiscal rules have major problems that can be significantly improved; and, in this perspective, 
it would be expedient to suggest changes and solutions. The presence of these rules is, however, the 
glue that allows for the co-existence of a centralized monetary policy and some form of institutional 
coordination of decentralized, that is, national, fiscal policies. A mere and systematic relaxation of 
fiscal rules would fully free the European institutions of any responsibility for accumulated fiscal 
imbalances at national levels. In this perspective, euro-area countries with high public debt would be 
exposed to the volatile assessment and to the short-term sanctioning of market investors without any 
European institutional protection.   
This threat is not just theoretical; it has already progressed due to the recent reform of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). After having long favored stricter European fiscal rules (with the 
tightening of the Stability and Growth Pact), the most rigorous countries of the euro area are now 
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moving towards granting increasing margins of fiscal flexibility to the most fragile member states. As 
showed by the decisions taken in the December 2018 and June 2019 meetings of the Eurogroup and 
Euro Summit, the ‘core’ countries are trying, however, to impose a quasi-automatic mechanism of 
sovereign debt restructuring on countries that are forced to activate European aid programs from the 
ESM. The new strategy of the ‘core’ countries is thus to place full responsibility and all the burdens 
arising from its recurrent fiscal imbalances on the individual member state in difficulty.           
     
 
  
 
  
  
